2018 Safety Recommendations

General
SR Number: 2018-19
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-19 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: For the maintenance implementation, the continuing airworthiness management organization must issue the total maintenance works in task cards in such a form that every step of the performed work to be certified separately. During the investigation it was proved that task cards were not issued with the above mentioned form but for the total of the works there were signed copies of the maintenance manual pages.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-19: The continuous airworthiness management organization to examine the establishment of a procedure for the issuance of job cards in such a way that will permit the monitoring and certification of performed tasks.
Response

SR Number:

2018-19 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-18
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-18 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: Examination of the aircraft’s technical log revealed that due to its construction, all the necessary data for aircraft’s flight it could not be recorded. More specifically, with the current technical log structure the accomplishment of the pro flight inspection could be certified and also it was unable to be determined the leg at which the aircraft was refueled.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-18: The continuous airworthiness management organization in collaboration with the training organization to re-examine the aircraft’s technical logs structure so that all necessary data, according to the current legislating framework, are recorded.
Response

SR Number:

2018-18 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Organization of Continuing Airworthiness Management
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-17
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-17 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: The investigation revealed that in aircraft’s technical logs were discrepancies in the entries which were corrected in wrong way so the airplane’s recordkeeping was unreliable. Also, the aircraft’s technical logs were not on board the aircraft in contrary to current regulating framework. The process of transferring the aircraft’s data and technical discrepancies by telephone was not securing their accuracy.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-17: The ATO to proceed to the pilot training for the correct update of aircraft’s technical logs.
Response

SR Number:

2018-17 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-16
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-16 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: From the investigation process and the analysis of collected data, it was revealed that at the ATO had been performed more compliance monitoring audits than those which had been programmed without detecting non-compliances.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-16: The ATO to proceed to reconsideration and revision of internal audits procedures and organization’s check lists so as the performed audits to become effective.
Response

SR Number:

2018-16 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-15
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-15 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: From the examination of the Organization’s trainees records it was evident the incomplete standardization in the implementation and supervision of the training procedure.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-15: The ATO to proceed to the reconsideration and revision of the operational procedures for complete standardization and supervision.
Response

SR Number:

2018-15 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Training Organization of West Greece Aeroclub
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-14
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-14 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During investigation and after the relevant interviews that were taken from the personnel of CAA’s licensing department, it was concluded that the specific department was understaff and its inability to fully implement the approved procedures as well as the inadequate resources for audits implementation during initial audits and for the fulfillment of the audit program for the maintenance of the issued licenses and certificates.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-14: Based on the number of certified training organizations and the project of licensing department, the CAA to review the staffing, the equipment and the available resources for the fulfillment of the project which is required by the legal framework and approved procedures of initial certification and continuous monitoring for the Organizations that certifies, authorizes and monitors.
Response

SR Number:

2018-14 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-13
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-13 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: In the procedure manual of the relevant CAA department for the organization licensing is described the procedure of the licensing and supervision of a training organization. According to this the licensing procedure undergoes an internal inspection followed by the final approval or extra actions to be taken. Also, it is described the procedure which has to be followed for the substitution of a training organization managers. From the investigation is concluded that during the licensing procedure and the organization’s managers substitution, omissions occurred which were not detected during the internal inspection procedure.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-13: The CAA to review the licensing and supervision procedures of the training organizations so that to detect possible omissions during the internal inspections.
Response

SR Number:

2018-13 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-12
Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-12 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During the investigation it was concluded that in the newly founded Organization, from its licensing until the accident day, had not been performed a compliance audit. From the audit program notified by CAA it was concluded that there was a restricted number of certified auditors in relation to the number of the training organizations to be audited whilst only one compliance monitoring audit had been programmed in 2016.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-12: The CAA to examine the revision of the procedures so that in newly founded training organizations more frequent compliance audits to be programmed.
Response

SR Number:

2018-12 -- Date Issued: 07/09/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed: link_64Final Report 07/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA)
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-11
Date Issued: 15/06/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Synoptic Report E02/2018

Status: CLOSED - Adequate SR_CLOSED
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-11 -- Date Issued: 15/06/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Synoptic Report E02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During investigation it was noticed that personnel of Civil Aviation Organizations operating at MEGARA airport (LGMG) is not aware of the Permanent Flight Orders issued by the Military Air Force of the Megara airport
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-11: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority to ensure that all the personnel of the Civil Aviation Organizations operating at MEGARA airport (LGMG) has been informed and is aware of the Permanent Flying Orders issued by the Military Air Force of the aforementioned airport.
Response

SR Number:

2018-11 -- Date Issued: 15/06/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Synoptic Report E02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Response: [HCAA]: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (HCAA), in its letter no. D3/B/18581/5598 is addressed to MEGARA [airport] General Aviation Service Unit by notification to Hellenic Aeronautical & Airsports Federation, Hellenic Army General Staff (3rd Office) and AAIASB:
[HCAA]: By accepting the above safety recommendation, in accordance with Art. 18 of the EU Regulation 996/2010 and the above mentioned safety recommendation [2018-11] , please ensure that:
(a) Civil Aviation Organizations (including [HCAA]) operating at Megara Airport [LGMG], as well as flight crews, maintenance personnel and personnel involved in any way in the flights during initial placement / start of operation in the aerodrome [LGMG], they must be required to sign, in a special book, acknowledging the Permanent Flight Orders of the airport [LGMG] and
(b) a periodic reminder of the procedures governed by the Permanent Flight Orders, their amendments and / or revisions shall be kept constantly. ";
[ NOTE: text in brackets is altered by AAIASB adding explanatory text or reducting text to protect personal data ]
General
SR Number: 2018-10
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Status: CLOSED - Adequate SR_CLOSED
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-10 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Recommendation: The failure to adhere to CRM principles exhibited during approach–landing must be addressed by the company and in particular for the case in which a member of the flight crew is also charged with top management functions.
Response

SR Number:

2018-10 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Response: After an internal safety investigation, SKY EXPRESS operator company accepted the safety recommendations 2018-9 and 2018-10 issued by AAIASB as described in its response with document Nr : SkyExpress / A / 4854 / 10.08.2018.
Operator company reviewed the wind limits, taking into account the "AIP GREECE" and the aircraft manufacturer's manuals and published a relevant directive on 02.03.2015 [notified to AAIASB], applying the new limits and dispatch criteria, and then revised its Part C Manual [notified to AAIASB].
Operator company also performed special iterative training of the pilots involved with this aircraft, in accordance with the recommendations of the Company's Safety Directorate, prior to their re-assignment to duties [notified to AAIASB].
Additionally, Operator company reports that it has held a special seminar in which this accident was presented to all flying personnel in December 2015.
General
SR Number: 2018-09
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Status: CLOSED - Adequate SR_CLOSED
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-09 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Recommendation: In its Operations Manual the Company must review wind limits having regard to the provisions of AIP GREECE.
Response

SR Number:

2018-09 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 03/2018

Addressee: Air Carrier, "SKY EXPRESS"
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Response: After an internal safety investigation, SKY EXPRESS operator company accepted the safety recommendations 2018-9 and 2018-10 issued by AAIASB as described in its response with document Nr : SkyExpress / A / 4854 / 10.08.2018.
Operator company reviewed the wind limits, taking into account the "AIP GREECE" and the aircraft manufacturer's manuals and published a relevant directive on 02.03.2015 [notified to AAIASB], applying the new limits and dispatch criteria, and then revised its Part C Manual [notified to AAIASB].
Operator company also performed special iterative training of the pilots involved with this aircraft, in accordance with the recommendations of the Company's Safety Directorate, prior to their re-assignment to duties [notified to AAIASB].
Additionally, Operator company reports that it has held a special seminar in which this accident was presented to all flying personnel in December 2015.
General
SR Number: 2018-08
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Engine manufacturer, ROTAX
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-08 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Engine manufacturer, ROTAX
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During the review of engine installation manual and maintenance instructions, SI 6UL94 and SI 9UL91-E, it was revealed that the illustrated and described fuel system layout was different from the one illustrated at the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). More specifically, in the installation manual and in maintenance instructions it was predicted the installation of two fuel filters between the fuel pump and carburetors whereas in IPC it was predicted the installation of one fuel filter between the fuel tank and fuel pump.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-08: The engine manufacturer, Rotax, to perform review of the above manuals and maintenance instructions and to take the appropriate actions to ensure that there is no inconsistency between these manuals.
Response

SR Number:

2018-08 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Engine manufacturer, ROTAX
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-07
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-07 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: According to the ULA manufacturer document, during ULA’s repair, it was performed a modification at the area under pilot’s seat, which is used as small items storage. The purpose of the modification was the security of the small items that are stored in this area so as to prevent their movement and potentially could block the engine control cables that are routed through the hull.
Additionally the manufacturer installed the routed through the hull, engine control cables inside plastic guides in order to deter their blockage in case that small item inside the hull is moved.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-07: The ULA manufacturer to consider the way of informing the owners of the same ULA regarding the problem of blocking control cables as well as for the performed modifications in order to address the specific problem.
Response

SR Number:

2018-07 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-06
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-06 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During investigation it was revealed that due to the routing of the engine control cables, there was contact of cables with metallic parts. Because of this, it was created wear to the control cables during their operation that affected the pilot’s power demand input to the carburetors.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-06: The Ultralight Aircraft manufacturer to review the routing of the control cables to the engine in order to prevent their contact with metal parts which created wear to the control cables.
Response

SR Number:

2018-06 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-05
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Response awaited SR OPEN
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-05 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During review of ULA’s Flight Operation Manual (FOM) that was published by its manufacturer, there were noticed ambiguities and deficiencies in the operation and maintenance instructions. More specifically, there was no clear correlation between the kind of scheduled inspections that must be carried out and the prescribed time period as well in paragraphs XI and XXI of the manual there were not properly formulated maintenance instructions and in paragraph VIII they were provided operating limitations only for the engine Rotax 912 and not for the engine Rotax 582 that this ULA was equipped. In addition in the maintenance instructions there wasn’t reference to the necessity or not of lubricating the engine control cables and they were deficiencies in the description of systems and specifications of ULA. Also, the FOM didn’t provide information concerning its revision status and the revision status of its pages.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-05: The Ultralight Aircraft manufacturer to consider the review and amendment of Flight Operation Manual in order the maintenance and operation instructions, specifications, systems description and the revision status to be unambiguous and complete.
Response

SR Number:

2018-05 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Manufacturer, Halley Apollo
Status: OPEN - Response awaited
Response:
General
SR Number: 2018-04
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: CLOSED - Adequate SR_CLOSED
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-04 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During ULA’s records collection at the Section of General Aviation of Civil Aviation Authority it was revealed that the archive of the specific ULA was not complete.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-04: The Civil Aviation Authority to consider the performance of archive completeness check of all registered ULAs in Section of General Aviation, in order to contain all the required documents that must accompany a ULA according to the regulatory framework and their procedures.
Response

SR Number:

2018-04 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: CLOSED - Adequate
Response: HCAA informed AAIASB by letter [HCAA/D2/E/32497/8453/03.11.2018] about the response of HCAA’s competent department D2/D [document:HCAA/D2/D/8105/30.10.2018] which states that the records of Ultralight Aircrafts include: Certificate of Registration, Certificate of Airworthiness, Aircraft Station License, Noise Certificate (if required), Certificate of Insurance, Operation Manual, airframe,engine and propeller maintenance manuals, Weight and balance sheet, Log Book, initial manufacturing check sheet. Also in the same response it is stated that a check and update of the total ultralight aircraft records is planned [by HCAA] concerning all above mentioned documents. [AAIASB assessed this response as “Adequate” and changed the SR 2018-04 status to “Closed” in its letter with document number AAIASB/4513/31.12.2018].
General
SR Number: 2018-03
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Partially adequate SR_Partially_accepted
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-03 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: It has been observed to many ULAs, but not to the specific one, that they have been modified after the issue of the certificate of airworthiness. According to the existing regulatory framework of ULAs, the airworthiness certificate does not have expiration date and in case of modifications the interested person must make an application for the inspection of the ULA and the renewal of its airworthiness certificate.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-03: The Civil Aviation Authority should examine the amendment of the ULAs regulation, so that the airworthiness certificate has specific time of validity and to establish a procedure of renewing the airworthiness certificate after its expiration.
Response

SR Number:

2018-03 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Response: HCAA by letter (doc. HCAA/D2/E/21866/7719 / 19.09.2018) states that, regarding the safety recommendations contained in the AAIASB final report 02-2018 regarding the investigation of SX-UAO ultralight trike accident:
1. Recommendations are accepted by HCAA
2. With reference to Recommendations 2018-01 to 2018-03, the proposed actions will be included in the forthcoming amendment of the National Ultralight Aircrafts Regulation.
3. With reference to Recommendation 2018-04, HCAA maintains and updates the records of of Ultralight Aircrafts with all the necessary documents accompanying an Ultralight Aircraft in accordance with its regulatory framework and procedures.
[AAIASB assessed the response to Recommendations 2018-01 -02 and -03 (until amendment of the Regulation) as “ Partially Adequate” and for Recommendation 2018-04 the reply is assessed as “Not Adequate” by AAIASB with its document AAIASB/3312/02.10.2018]
General
SR Number: 2018-02
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Partially adequate SR_Partially_accepted
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-02 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: At article 11 of ULAs regulation, it is mentioned that: ‘The Civil Aviation Authority has the right through its competent personnel to perform unscheduled inspections of the technical status of the ULAs’. To the above mentioned it is not specified the frequency of the inspections.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-02: The Civil Aviation Authority should consider the possibility of performing the technical status inspections in predetermined time periods.
Response

SR Number:

2018-02 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Response: HCAA by letter (doc. HCAA/D2/E/21866/7719 / 19.09.2018) states that, regarding the safety recommendations contained in the AAIASB final report 02-2018 regarding the investigation of SX-UAO ultralight trike accident:
1. Recommendations are accepted by HCAA
2. With reference to Recommendations 2018-01 to 2018-03, the proposed actions will be included in the forthcoming amendment of the National Ultralight Aircrafts Regulation.
3. With reference to Recommendation 2018-04, HCAA maintains and updates the records of of Ultralight Aircrafts with all the necessary documents accompanying an Ultralight Aircraft in accordance with its regulatory framework and procedures.
[AAIASB assessed the response to Recommendations 2018-01 -02 and -03 (until amendment of the Regulation) as “ Partially Adequate” and for Recommendation 2018-04 the reply is assessed as “Not Adequate” by AAIASB with its document AAIASB/3312/02.10.2018]
General
SR Number: 2018-01
Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Status: OPEN - Partially adequate SR_Partially_accepted
Recommendation

SR Number:

2018-01 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Recommendation: PREAMBLE: During Investigation, it was revealed errors and misinterpretations during the maintenance of the ULA. The existing regulatory framework for ULAs does not specify the specialty and qualifications of the persons involved in the maintenance process for ULAs used for non-training purposes.
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION 2018-01: The Civil Aviation Authority should consider the possibility of amending the regulation of ULAs, in order to determine the qualification of those involved in the maintenance of ULAs used for non-training purposes.
Response

SR Number:

2018-01 -- Date Issued: 14/05/2018
Why this Recommendation was Developed:

link_64Final Report 02/2018

Addressee: Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority (H.C.A.A.)
Status: OPEN - Partially adequate
Response: HCAA by letter (doc. HCAA/D2/E/21866/7719 / 19.09.2018) states that, regarding the safety recommendations contained in the AAIASB final report 02-2018 regarding the investigation of SX-UAO ultralight trike accident:
1. Recommendations are accepted by HCAA
2. With reference to Recommendations 2018-01 to 2018-03, the proposed actions will be included in the forthcoming amendment of the National Ultralight Aircrafts Regulation.
3. With reference to Recommendation 2018-04, HCAA maintains and updates the records of of Ultralight Aircrafts with all the necessary documents accompanying an Ultralight Aircraft in accordance with its regulatory framework and procedures.
[AAIASB assessed the response to Recommendations 2018-01 -02 and -03 (until amendment of the Regulation) as “ Partially Adequate” and for Recommendation 2018-04 the reply is assessed as “Not Adequate” by AAIASB with its document AAIASB/3312/02.10.2018]
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