



**AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION & AVIATION SAFETY BOARD**

**Incident Report of the a/c HB-JIC  
at Rhodes Airport “Diagoras”  
on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2008**

**Report No 08/2009**



**MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURES, TRANSPORTS & NETWORKS**



**HELLENIC REPUBLIC  
MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS**

**AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND AVIATION  
SAFETY BOARD  
(AAIASB)**



**Incident Report a/c HB-JIC  
Rhodes Airport "Diagoras"  
12<sup>th</sup> October 2008**

**08 / 2009**

**INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT**  
**08 / 2008**

Incident of the a/c HB-JIC of Hello AG  
at the apron of Rhodes Airport “Diagoras” on 12<sup>th</sup> October 2008

The incident investigation was carried out by the Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board in accordance with:

- ANNEX 13
- Hellenic Republic Law 2912/2001
- E.U. Directive 94/56

**The sole objective of the investigation is the prevention of similar accidents in the future.**

**The Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board**

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*Captain Akrivos D. Tsolakis*

**Members**

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Lawyer

*Helias Nikolaidis*  
Captain

*George Stylios*  
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Aeronautical Engineer

**Secretary**

*John Papadopoulos*

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**OPERATOR** : HELLO AG  
**OWNER** : BCC Equipment Leasing Corporation,  
Renton, P.O. Box 432; CH 8024 Zurich  
**MANUFACTURER** : McDonnell Douglas Corporation. (The  
Boeing Co. since 30-01-88)  
**AIRCRAFT TYPE** : MD-90-30  
**NATIONALITY** : SWISS  
**REGISTRATION** : HB-JIC  
**LOCATION OF INCIDENT** : "Diagoras" AIRPORT, RHODES, HELLAS  
**DATE AND TIME** : 12/10/2008 & 17:12  
**NOTE** : All times UTC. (Local time UTC+3 h)

#### **SUMMARY**

On October 12<sup>th</sup>, 2008, a BOEING MD-90-30 airplane, of the Swiss Air Carrier HELLO AG, departing from "Diagoras" Airport, Rhodes, Hellas, operating the passenger flight RHODES - BASEL, (Switzerland), Flight No FHE6759, during taxi out to Runway 25, its left wing tip, collided on a parked, Containers Loader Machine, property of Goldair Handling, resulting in damage on the left wing tip area and on the No 5 left wing Leading Edge Slat. Following the instructions from the Control Tower, the Flight Crew returned the airplane back to the Apron for examination and the airplane departed on October 14<sup>th</sup>, 2008, at about 11:30 h on a non-revenue flight.

The AAIASB was informed on 13 October 2008 and following Chairman Decision No AAIASB/446/13-10-2008, Mr. Constantinos Gavrilakis Aircraft Engineer, appointed as Investigator, to investigate the incident, as per Hellenic Law 2912/2001.

The draft final report was send to the Swiss Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau for their comments as per Annex 13 of Chicago Convention. The comments from the Swiss AAIB were taking into account in the report.

Four safety recommendations were issued.

## **1. FACTUAL INFORMATION**

### **1.1. HISTORY OF FLIGHT**

The flight HELLO AG, FHE6759 was a chartered passenger flight. The airplane with Swiss Registration HB-JIC, operating the flight FHE 6758, arrived at "Diagoras" Airport, Rhodes, on 12 October 2008 around 16:25 h and parked at the stand No 9 of the Apron. After the disembarkation of the passengers upon arrival and the boarding of the passengers of the flight FHE 6759, the Flight Crew obtained taxi clearance at 17:07:09 h from "Diagoras" Airport, Control Tower to taxi to Runway 25 holding point via Taxiway A (Appendix A).

The aircraft under Captain's control, with the nose gear taxi lights on, began to move turning initially to the right then turning to the left towards the extension of Taxiway A. This direction cross parking position No 8 which was vacated by an aircraft departed a few minutes earlier. After the left turn of the airplane, the Marshaller realizing that the Flight Crew were not following his signals, deviating the yellow and white lines, and estimating the collision danger of the airplane's left wing tip with the Containers Loader Machine being North of the Stand No8, tried to attract the Flight Crew attention, using the yellow marshalling lights to stop the airplane, but without success.

During the airplane's roll towards Taxiway A, the left wingtip, travelling over the forward platform of the Containers Loader Machine, hit initially on the driving station of the said machine, located at the right side of the forward platform and specifically on the forward face of the driving station, about 15 cm from the left edge and about 20 cm below its top end, according to the visible imprints on the station, producing damage on the case of the station, which tilted about 30° – 40° backwards relative to its position on the machine and the vertical axis. According to the indications, the wing probably deflected upwards, then the wing tip lower surface scratched on the top of the driving station and subsequently, the wingtip's lower surface, scratched on the top of the driver's seat and by keeping on moving, hit on a barrier, of the Containers Loader Machine, which completely separated from its base. The next and last obstacle was the step accessing the control station. The wing colliding on it, forced the step to deform backwards / outwards. Then the wing was free to travel over the rear platform of the

Containers Loader Machine, which was not an obstacle, as its height was significantly lower than the level of the wing. The airplane continued to move towards Taxiway A. The Marshaller, according to his statement, kept on running in parallel with the airplane's track for about 20 m, trying to attract the crew's attention, but in the mean time, the wing of the airplane came so close to him, that he had to bend down to avoid it from hitting him. He did so and the wing passed over his head. At that point the Marshaller ceased his efforts and informed the Airport Authorities and the Airport Authority Staff advised the Control Tower, who instructed the Flight Crew to return to the Apron. The Crew returned the airplane back, and parked the airplane at the stand No 9, where the Crew and the Passengers, disembarked, since the airplane after the examination was found to be not airworthy. The airplane departed on 14 October 2008, at about 11:30 h operating on a non-revenue flight. The flight commenced under approval NTO (Non Technical Objection) obtained from the Boeing Aircraft Co., provided that the damaged wing tip was removed and provided that no cracks were found in the damaged section of the No 5 left hand wing leading edge slat.

### 1.2 INJURIES TO PERSONS

<b>Injuries</b>	<b>Crew</b>	<b>Passengers</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Fatal</b>	0	0	0
<b>Serious</b>	0	0	0
<b>Minor</b>	0	0	0
<b>None</b>	2 / 4	167	-----


### 1.3 DAMAGE TO AIRPLANE

According to the on site airplane examination, at about 07:00 h local time on 14 October 2008 at "Diagoras" Airport, Rhodes, Hellas, Stand 09, the following damages were observed on the left side wing:


**A: Left Hand wing # 05 Leading Edge Slat:**

The Left Hand (LH) wing # 05 Leading Edge Slat was found with a dent near its outboard end at the front curved area. In accordance with the records in the Airplane Technical Log Book (ATL) no other damage was observed. (Picture 1)

# 05 L/E Slat Dent



**Picture 1**



**Picture 2**

**B. LH Wing tip:**

The LH Wing tip was found to have damage mainly in the front/ side areas, where the LH wing tip Navigation and Strobe Lights are located, both of which were destroyed. Also the LH wing tip retractable landing light, was destroyed, but without significant damage to its case.

Signs of scratches, dents and wear were observed on the lower surface of the wing tip, between the retractable landing light and near up to the trailing edge. The same scratches, dents and wear were observed on the base of the aerodynamic fairing of the logo light. This light was observed to be missing although its base was still attached. (Picture 2).

**1.4 OTHER DAMAGE**

**1.4.1. Container Loader Machine Damages**

The airplane's LH wingtip, hit about 15 cm from the left edge and about 20 cm below its top end, producing damage on the station, which tilted about 30° - 40° backwards, relative to its position on the machine and the vertical axis.

Damage was caused to the barrier of the Containers Loader Machine which completely separated from its base and to the step accessing the station that was inclined backwards and outwards.

## **1.5 PERSONNEL INFORMATION**

### **1.5.1 The Captain**

Male, age 35

The Captain held an airline transport pilot license (airplanes) (**JAR-FCL ATPL (A)**) certificate, issued by the Netherlands Civil Aviation Authority, valid until 1-11-2012 Rating IR (A) DC9-80/MD88/MD90 (Pilot-in-Command, VFR/IFR) valid until 1-11-2008.

The Captain held class (I) medical certificate valid until 11-6-2009 and class (II) valid until 11-6-2013 with the limitation to wear corrective lenses and carry a spare set.

In Accordance with his personal records:

LPC (License Proficiency Check) carried out on	: 18-10-2007
OPC (Operator Proficiency Check) carried out on	: 28-04-2008
RECURRENT TRAINING carried out on	: 13-11-2007
LINE CHECK carried out on	: 12-01-2008
CRM (Crew Resource Management) Initial carried out on	: 01-06-2004, and Recurrent on 13-11-2007
Total Flight Experience	: 5.710 h
Flight Experience on MD-90	: 3.145 h
Last 90 days	: 271:02 h
Last 30 days	: 89:58 h
Last 7 days	: 19:40 h
Off-Duty period before commencing duty (FHE6758)	: 15:56 h

He had flown three flights to Rhodes Airport within 2008

### 1.5.2 The Co-pilot

Male, age 31.

The Co-pilot held a Commercial Pilot License (airplanes) (JAA-FCL CPL(A)) issued by the Department of Civil Aviation Malta, valid until 27-05-2013 Rating DC9-80/MD88/MD90 valid until 28-02-2009.

The Co-pilot held medical certificate, issued by the Department of Civil Aviation Malta, class (I) valid until 08-01-2009 and class (II) valid until 08-01-2014.

In Accordance with his personal records:

LPC (License Proficiency Check) carried out on	: 26-02-2008
OPC (Operator Proficiency Check) carried out on	: 08-07-2008
RECURRENT TRAINING carried out on	: 30-01-2008
LINE CHECK carried out on	: 17-06-2008
CRM (Crew Resource Management) Initial carried out on	: 20-03-2007, and Recurrent on 30-01-2008
Total Flight Experience	: 3466:10 h
Flight Experience on MD-90	: 1157:10 h
Last 90 days	: 208:21 h
Last 30 days	: 24:20 h
Last 7 days	: 07:47 h
Off-Duty period before commencing duty (FHE6758)	: 121:15 h

The incident flight was his first to Rhodes Airport.

### 1.5.3 The Marshaller

Male, age 20

He had attended marshalling training on 24-03-2008

## 1.6 AIRPLANE INFORMATION

The MD-90 is a twin jet engine, low-wing, transport- category, narrow body airplane, derived from earlier DC-9 series model airplanes.

Manufacturer	: McDonnell Douglas Corporation (The Boeing Co. since 30-01-88)
Type	: MD-90-30

MSN : 53576  
Airworthiness Review Certificate (ARC) : JIC20080917b issued on 17-09-2008 by Part M Section A Subpart G Organization CH.MG.1042 Hello AG Basel-Airport, Switzerland, valid until 16-09-09.  
  
Airframe Total FH : 20775 (8105 FC)  
MTOW : 76204 kg  
MLW : 64410 kg  
T/Off Mass for the flight FHE6759 : 71380 kg

### **1.6.1 Engines**

The airplane was powered by 2 jet engines type IAE V2538-D5

- Engine No 1 Serial Number: V20135
- Engine No 2 Serial Number: V20136

### **1.7. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION**

Not applicable

### **1.8. AIDS TO NAVIGATION**

#### **1.8.1. RHO "Diagoras" Airport Apron & Taxiways Charts**

The Flight Crew was using Chart / Diagram GAD/APSI RODOS DIAGORAS GREECE, ASIR Page 1 dated 27 JUL 07 Change: A.3, which use the Flight Crew of HELLO AG.

### **1.9. COMMUNICATIONS**

The communication between the Control Tower and the Flight Crew was carried out in English and written transcription received.

The conversation regarding the taxi authorization was as following:

*«17:02:19 FHE 6759 to Control Tower: FHE 6759 is ready for start up.*

*17:02:22 Control Tower to FHE 6759: Start up approved, FHE 6759.*

*17:02:27 FHE 6759 to Control Tower: Start up approved, 6759.*

*17:07:05 FHE 6759 to Control Tower: FHE 6759 is ready to taxi.*

17:07:09 Control Tower to FHE 6759: Taxi RWY 25 via A, QNH 1014.


17:07:13 FHE 6759 to Control Tower: Via A RWY 25, FHE 6759, QNH 1014.»

### 1.10. AIRPORT INFORMATION

"Diagoras" Airport, Rhodes, Hellas, is International and has a single Runway with dimensions 3305 m X 45 m and orientation 070° - 250° (07/25) and altitude 18,8 ft MSL. It has two main Taxiways (A & F), one Apron Taxiway and an Apron accommodating thirteen (13) stands, as depicted in AIP GREECE – VOLUME 1 CAA 24 JUN 1996 / 263 (Appendix A).

The Apron is illuminated by illuminators installed on high altitude pylons, near the terminal building, at the south side of the Apron.

The Apron floor markings consist of yellow and white lines. The white lines are the boundary lines of the airplane parking area and the yellow lines are for the airplane taxi guidance. It was observed that on the Apron floor, there are old yellow lines as well. These are almost faded out, but still visible, that under certain conditions, may be confusing, with the valid ones, by the crews. (Picture 3)



Picture 3 - Apron Lines – Position 9

## **1.11 RECORDERS**

### **1.11.1 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)**

The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell CVR, P/N 980-6062-001. Delivery of the airplane's Cockpit Voice Recorder was requested. The request was not satisfied on the grounds that it contained no recordings because in the time elapsed the recordings had been erased.

In accordance with paragraph EU-OPS 1.085 (f)(10)(ii) Annex III of the EU Regulation 859/2008 the crew must de-energize the CVR, in the event that he/she believes that the recorded data should be preserved for incident or accident investigation<sup>1</sup>

### **1.11.2 Flight Data Recorder (FDR)**

Delivery of the airplane's Flight Data Recorder was not requested because of the nature of the incident.

## **1.12. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION**

Fragments of various dimensions and shapes, originating from the left wing tip transparent aerodynamic navigation light and strobe light canopy, were found on the ground. One piece just on the end of the white line of the circle setting the boundary of stand No 8, clear area and some others in distances up to 1 to 2 meters from the imaginary extension of that line. Others of smaller dimensions originating from the left wing tip navigation light red cover were found on the ground, in a distance of about four meters from the end of the white line of the circle, setting the boundary of the stand No 8. Fragments were also on the container loader machine forward and aft of the driving and control station.

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<sup>1</sup> The operator after receiving a copy of the draft report that was send to Swiss AAIB communicated the EU-OPS 1.085 (f)(10)(ii) requirement to all cockpit crews during the last ground refresher training and manuals are updated accordingly.

### **1.13. MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION**

#### **1.13.1. Crew and Ground Staff examinations for indication of alcohol or drug consumption**

In accordance with the regulation HCAA/D3/B/28021/6495/19.07.07 “Checks in persons which are involved in the maintenance, preparation and flight of civil airplanes, for the ascertainment of alcohol and toxic substances or medicines in their organism” (Gov. Gaz. B/1380/03.09.07) after an incident the airport authority is taking care to carry out examinations for alcohol consumption and use of toxic drugs and medication of the involved personnel.

No such examinations were performed to the flight crew and the ground staff involved in the incident.

### **1.14. FIRE**

No fire erupted.

### **1.15. SURVIVAL ASPECTS**

Not applicable.

### **1.16. STRUCTURAL TEST AND RESEARCH**

Not applicable.

### **1.17. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION**

#### **1.17.1. Hello Airlines AG**

HELLO AIRLINES AG is a public air transport carrier, held Air Operator Certificate (AOC No 1042) issued by the Swiss Federal Office for Civil Aviation valid until 31.08.2010.

#### **1.17.2 Goldair Handling**

Goldair Handling is a Ground Handling Services Company situated at Rhodes Airport in an out-door space of 1940 m<sup>2</sup>, for the purpose of parking the ground service equipment.

## **1.18. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

### **1.18.1. The probable position of the machine at the time of the incident.**

At the time when the investigator arrived in Rhodes "Diagoras" Airport on 13 October 2008, the machine had already been moved away from the incident area. Therefore it was not possible to determine the distances and the position of the machine at the moment of the collision, in an exact manner. From the photographs taken on 13 October 2008 by the Airport Authorities personnel and from other sources, the machine occupies a space inside of the white line and its imaginary extension, draws the white circle periphery of the boundary of the aircraft parking position No 8. (Pictures 4 & 5). The area indicated, from the sources mentioned above, that the Containers Loader Machine, with registration plates No 70898, was found at the moment of the incident, is not related to the area that has been given to Goldair Handling, by "Diagoras" Airport, Rhodes, Airport Authorities, for parking their equipment.



**Picture 4**



**Picture 5**

### **1.18.2. Crew Statements.**

In accordance to the Flight Crew statements, the existing white, yellow, and semi-faded lines markings on the tarmac floor and the strong Apron illumination by the illuminators installed at the opposite side, after the initial Left Turn, made it difficult to distinguish the yellow line which they must follow in order to taxi-out from the particular parking position and therefore followed the direction which was indicated by a yellow arrow, located at the left side, pointing to the Taxiway A, a track that the airplane which was parked at stand No8 followed and had taxied-out shortly before. In addition, the airport

Apron and the Taxiways chart, available to the Flight Crew, had no clear indicators for the course that they had to follow to taxi out from stand 9. Also the Flight Crew said in their statement that they did not realize the collision and assumed they had taxied through a path hole.

### **1.19. USEFUL AND EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUE**

Not applicable

## **2. ANALYSIS**

### **2.1. Airplane Taxi-out**

After engines start-up, the Control Tower, of "Diagoras" Rhodes Airport, cleared the aircraft to proceed to the holding point of Runway 25, via Taxiway A by saying: «*Taxi RWY 25 via A, QNH 1014.* »

The Marshaller after engines start-up, moved into position in front and to the right side of the aircraft (Appendix B, Position 1), having in sight the Copilot and with the foreseen signals, indicated the right turn direction which the airplane had to follow in order to vacate the parking position and to taxi into the Apron Taxiway. In order to reach the Taxiway A, from the parking position 9 where the airplane was parked, it should execute a right direction turn of about 130° relative to its orientation, to meet the Apron Taxiway Central Line (CL), then with 90° left turn to align with the Apron Taxiway CL and while rolling on it, to execute again 90° left turn and then 90° right turn to enter the Taxiway A.

Instead of this the airplane executed a right direction turn about 30° - 40° relative to its orientation and after that deviated from the normal expected direction, turning to the left inside the Apron area crossing the parking position 8, in order to align with the imaginary extension, of the Taxiway A center line. The Marshaller, who after the right turn of the aircraft found himself at the left side of the aircraft, and watching the wrong direction of the aircraft, tried to show the correct direction using signals. The aircraft continued towards Taxiway A through the parking position 8 and the Marshaller realizing the upcoming danger of the collision of the aircraft's wing tip with the Containers Loader Machine which was parked at the edge of the Apron and within the safety area of the

parking position 8, moved in parallel with the airplane's track trying with signals to warn the crew, without success. The aircraft continued rolling towards Taxiway A and the left hand wing tip collided on the Containers Loader Machine. (See Appendix B)

According to the crew statement they did not deviate deliberately, but because they saw a yellow arrow on the Apron floor, pointing towards Taxiway A and also, because the airplane that had departed shortly before from stand 8 had followed the same direction. Indeed, there is this arrow there (Picture 6) but this is the turn indicator were the Captain initiates a right hand turn for the final parking position of stand 8 and it is at the right side of the imaginary extension of the Taxiway A center line, having no relation with the traffic of the position 9.

In reference to the line markings (those that are in effect and the old semi-faded not in effect) in the Apron area and the strong illumination from the illuminators at the South edge of the Apron which the crew stated that were obstructing them to distinguish the lines which they had to follow, indeed are existing old ones not in effect and new marking lines, but the illumination does not constitute problems, as according to the written statement of the Airport Authorities, there had never been any recorded / reported complaints by Flight Crews.

In any case, if in fact the old and new lines or the strong illumination did make it difficult to distinguish the correct line that the crew had to follow in order to enter the Apron Taxiway CL and then to move to Taxiway A, the Captain should stop the airplane and look for the Marshaller for assistance, but since he kept moving he should have made sure that the area in which the aircraft was moving is free of obstacles.

The Captain should always have full awareness of the area surrounding the aircraft. Also they must not enter or exit from a parking position without the Marshaller's instructions. In this particular case the Captain states that after the initial right turn lost visual contact with the Marshaller, who states that being on the left side of the airplane and seeing the wrong course being followed, tried, initially with signals, then running in parallel with the airplane to prevent the said course. Thus if the Captain was in doubt about the route he had to follow, he could have looked for the Marshaller, who was to his side and was easy to locate him, or to stop the airplane.



**Picture 6**

In reference to the unclear indications of the Apron chart available to the crew, for exit from position 9, no chart available for use by the Air Operators, contains details regarding the airplanes' exit from the parking positions, on the grounds that the crew will follow the Marshaller's instructions and the Apron guidance lines.

## **2.2 The position of the Containers Loader Machine**

In accordance with the ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices, specifically in the Chicago Convention Annex 14 paragraph 5.2.14, safety lines must be drawn in the parking areas of the aircraft, in such manner to define the areas assigned for use by the vehicles and the ground handling in order to ensure safe segregation from the aircraft.

Position 8 in the Apron of Rhodes Airport, is defined by a white circular line. In its north south side the safety line ends at the point where the tarmac of the Apron area ends and the earthen surface between the Apron and the Runway begins. The fact that the safety line does not continue into the earthen surface because of technical difficulties

(existence of self-sown vegetation) does not mean that the position 8 safety area, does not also include the arc that would be drawn into the earthen surface if the line marking could be continued.

The Containers Loader Machine was not serving at that moment an aircraft and was parked where the tarmac of the Apron ends and the earth surface begins between the Apron and the Runway. Thus it was inside the position 8 safety area, while it should have been in the area allocated to the Handling Company by the Airport Authorities, for parking of the vehicles and the ground equipment.

### **3. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **3.1. FINDINGS**

- 3.1.1.** The Flight Crewmembers of Hello Airlines flight FHE 6759 were properly certificated and qualified to perform the flight.
- 3.1.2.** The airplane was airworthy for the flight it was intended to operate.
- 3.1.3.** During the taxi initiation, signals for the course that should have been followed by the aircraft had been given by the Marshaller.
- 3.1.4.** The Flight Crew stated that it faced difficulties in distinguishing the lines they had to follow.
- 3.1.5.** In the Apron there are lines, those which are valid and are painted in bright yellow color and the old semi-faded which are not valid, that may confuse the Flight Crews.
- 3.1.6.** The Flight Crew despite stating that they faced difficulties during the taxi-out from the parking position did not stop taxiing to ask assistance from the Marshaller.
- 3.1.7.** The Containers Loader Machine was parked in an area, which was not intended for the parking of aircraft servicing equipment.

**3.1.8** The out of the lines course of the airplane and the Containers Loader Machine being parked in a non allowed area, resulted in the collision of the wing tip on the machine.

**3.1.9** The Airport Authority did not take care to carry out examinations for alcohol consumption and use of toxic drugs and medication to the flight crew and the ground staff involved in the incident.

### **3.2 PROBABLE CAUSES**

The probable cause of the incident is the out of the lines deviation of the airplane during the taxi out from the parking position.

### **3.3. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS**

**3.3.1.** The presence of the Containers Loader Machine, in a non-permitted area.

**3.3.2.** The omission of the Flight Crew to seek assistance when, as they declared, they faced difficulties in distinguishing the lines they should follow.

## **4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **4.1. TO THE AIR OPERATOR**

**4.1.1.** 2009-08<sup>2</sup> Hello Airways AG must remind its Flight Crews, the necessity to be scholastic in maintaining taxiing procedures and if difficulties or doubts arise to declare it to the Authorities, and/or stop the airplane, until they obtain instructions and/or assistance if required.

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<sup>2</sup> The operator after receiving a copy of the draft report that was send to Swiss AAIB, communicated the recommendation, within 10 days, to its all flight crew members.

## **4.2. TO THE “DIAGORAS” AIRPORT RHODES**

- 4.2.1. 2009-09** Must remove immediately all the old lines and signals that are not in effect, not only in the Apron area but in all the areas of "Diagoras" Rhodes Airport.
- 4.2.2. 2009-10** Must take care in order for the aircraft service vehicles being parked in the areas assigned for this purpose, by the Airport Authorities.
- 4.2.3. 2009-11** Must implement the regulation HCAA/D3/B/28021/6495/19.07.07 “Checks in persons involved in the maintenance, preparation and flight of civil airplanes, for the ascertainment of alcohol and toxic substances or medicines in their organism” (Gov. Gaz. B/1380/03.09.07)

**Athens, 18 November 2009**

### **THE CHAIRMAN**

Akrivos Tsolakis

**Exact Copy  
The Secretary**

J. Papadopoulos

### **THE MEMBERS**

G. Kyriakopoulos

H. Nikolaidis

G. Stylios

Tr. Tsitinidis

### **Note:**

*This report has been translated and published by the Hellenic Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in Greece should be considered as the work of reference.*



Appendix B

